with their capitation payments and contractual obligations to provide services, present a set o f economic incentives that depart significantly from those of the conventional fee-for-service medical care system. It m ight be expected that these incentive dif ferences will result in different approaches to the allocation of medical resources. Furthermore, these allocation or rationing mechanisms m ight have ethical implications because of the differential impact on various socioeconomic groups. This paper will address a series o f questions arising from the dif ferences between prepaid and fee-for-service systems. The first section will examine the incentives under each system. In doing so, it will focus on incentives to the enrollee or patient, to the organization, and to providers within the system. This discussion will highlight the conflicting incentives inherent in various arrangements. The second section will examine how these incentives and conflicts may be dealt with in terms of the rationing or allocation of resources. The third section will expand the analysis to consider the probable effects of different systems with respect to various socioeconomic groups. This discussion will focus on both the microquestion o f the impact of
various mechanisms to allocate services among plan members, and the macroquestion o f the effects o f H M O enrollment and marketing decisions on who gets access to H M O options. To the extent possible, this discussion will include empirical evidence on the m agnitude of such effects. The fourth section extends the discussion to speculate on the possible effects o f an increasingly competitive environment for HM Os and other health care plans. Again, while this section will be based largely on conjecture, some evidence is available for analysis. The final section o f the paper will consider the ethical implications of the issues already raised and will discuss some of the policy im plications arising from them.
Economic Incentives in Various Medical Settings
Economic incentives and allocation mechanisms exist in all medical care delivery systems. Defining either optimally efficient or ethically just systems within the context o f medical care realities is a task well beyond the scope o f this paper. Instead, the focus here is on how various prepaid systems, o f which H M O s are one notable example, differ from the conventional, primarily fee-for-service system. Sub sequent discussions may then address the desirability of alternative systems.
Incentives in the C o n v en tio n al Fee-for-Service S e ttin g
The primary actors in the medical care system are: 1) consumers or, after they begin to receive medical care, patients; 2) insurance com panies or other third parties; 3) physicians; and 4) hospitals. For most employed people and their families, health insurance is purchased through employer or union groups, often with a substantial employer contribution. The insurance plan or plans to be offered are selected by the employer or union and in most cases only one option is available to the employee. W hen ill, the patient selects a physician to diagnose the problem, provide treatment, and serve as an agent in arranging for the provision o f services by hospitals and other physicians. All of these providers are typically paid on a fee-for-service or cost-reim bursement basis by the patient, the patient's insurer, or the government.
To the extent that insurance or other third-party payments such as Medicaid reduce the net price of services to the patient, more medical care will be demanded than if the patient paid the total bill (Newhouse et a l., 1981) . How much greater demand will be, or in economic terms the price elasticity o f demand, is a much debated empirical question, but it is generally agreed that there is some increase, and that it is proportionately greater for discretionary and ambulatory services than for emergency and hospital services. Si multaneously, fee-for-service payments to the providers create a natural incentive to do more and respond to the increased demand.
Incentives in a n H M O S e ttin g
An H M O changes some o f these linkages in ways that alter substan tially the economic incentives. The patient no longer pays fee-forservice, except for an occasional small copayment o f a dollar or two, so demand is likely to increase relative to conventional coverage. The H M O can also develop a set o f financial linkages that tie together the physician, hospital, and insurer in a fashion quite unlike that of the conventional system. In contrast to the typical fee-for-service situation, the physicians and hospitals gain economically by doing less. This sets up a direct conflict with their patients whose com prehensive coverage leads them to demand even more than is usually the case.
In H M Os where the physicians practice as a group, two payment schemes are generally used: 1) salaries, with some type o f bonuses if the group performs well; or 2) fee-for-service based payments mod ified to reflect the total pool o f funds available. Salaries, of course, provide an incentive to exert oneself as little as possible unless there are other rewards for good performance. Fee-for-service payments tend to increase productivity-as measured by services per hour and hours worked per year-but increase the conflict between incentives to do more and the group incentives to do less (Held and Reinhardt, 1980) . In addition to the group model H M O , there is the individual practice association (IPA) model which typically involves an HMO acting as a health plan which then contracts through an intermediary organization with independent office-based physicians to provide ser vices. These physicians agree to accept payment by the HM O as payment in full and to allow a withholding o f these fees to be placed at risk. The withheld fee is paid back only if the H M O meets its financial goals. Thus, while the individual physician can still earn more by performing more services, he or she can lose money if the physicians collectively provide or order too much or too expensive care.
The implications of these different economic incentives on the sup ply of services by the H M O and its providers are quite complex. When the physicians are essentially salaried and share in the financial success of the plan, they will collectively and individually probably try to reduce services. When physicians are essentially paid on a feefor-service basis within a group or IPA type H M O , this incentive to do more will be only partially offset by the collective risk-sharing. This is especially true in IPAs in which the prepaid patients typically account for under 15 percent of the physicians' caseload.
O r g a n iz a tio n a l Influences
While economic incentives are clearly different in H M O s, one must also consider a second dimension of difference-the organizational setting. The prepaid-group-practice type of H M O , which has been the economically most successful model, is characterized by both prepayment a n d the group-practice mode of delivery. Often, one of the attractions for physicians of large group practices is a more reg ularly scheduled life, with vacation time, educational leave, shorter hours, and on-call coverage. Such arrangements imply less doctorpatient continuity and typically a more bureaucratic organization (Luft, 1981; Mechanic, 1976) . Prepaid groups, in particular, seem to have developed appointment and scheduling systems that reduce patient waiting time in the office but increase the time one must wait to obtain an appointment. Patients who drop in or request a visit the same day are typically seen in an urgent-care clinic, usually by a physician on rotation, rather than their usual provider.
In the discussion that follows it will not be possible to examine all possible combinations of economic and organizational factors that may influence the provision of services. Instead, three models of practice will be discussed. The first is the conventional system of independently practicing fee-for-service providers with third-party insurance available for the patient. The second is the individual prac tice association or IPA model H M O involving primarily independent fee-for-service practitioners linked through a risk-sharing arrangement with an H M O . The third is the prepaid-group-practice or PGP model H M O composed of a large multispecialty-physician group practice which obtains most o f its revenue from the H M O in the form of fixed capitation or salary payments plus some risk sharing based on overall plan performance.
M ethods o f A llo c a tin g Services in H M O s
In classical market situations, goods and services are allocated through a price system. In medical care, various factors combine to cause substantial deviations from a market in which price is the only means o f allocation. Information is scarce, both because o f restrictions on advertising and, more importantly, because o f the technical nature o f the product, so consumers cannot make rational decisions (Arrow, 1963) . N ot only m ust the patient rely upon the physician to diagnose and provide services, but in many instances it is difficult to check on performance, so trust becomes an important factor. Medical services also require the presence of the patient and thus impose a time cost to obtain medical care and information about treatment alternatives.
Further complicating the analysis of the allocation of medical ser vices is the fact that two levels of decisions are involved. The first decision is the type of insurance cum medical delivery system, that is, conventional insurance with independent fee-for-service providers or a prepaid system with a more limited choice of providers. (Of course, one also must consider which of the available providers one will choose within these two groupings.) The second level of decision concerns how much medical care will be consumed in treating a specific problem. Each type of decision reflects the preferences and behaviors of consumers/patients, on the one hand, and insurers/providers on the other. HM O s and insurers can attem pt to influence the enrollment choices of consumers, and providers can influence or control the services delivered. Consumers often have strong preferences for practice setting (group vs. solo) and constrained vs. free choice of provider. Patients also have preferences, sometimes strongly held ones, as to the treatments they expect for specific illnesses. The following discussion will examine first the factors that influence treatment de cisions and how these m ight vary among different practice settings; these m ight be termed " service allocation or rationing" issues. The focus will then widen to consider the allocation of consumers among systems; these m ight be termed " enrollment allocation or rationing" issues.
D ecisio n m ak in g in Three Types o f M e d ic a l T reatm en t
When examining how medical care is allocated under various systems, it is useful to distinguish three major types of services: 1) patient initiated visits; 2) physician initiated or controlled visits; and 3) hospitalizations (Gertm an, 1974) . In a typical situation, a person recognizes certain problems or symptoms and decides that an ex amination by a physician is warranted. Obviously, whether a physician is actually seen will depend on the fee that m ust be paid, time costs, transportation and access costs, and whether the patient knows a potential provider. A t the end o f the examination, the physician may request a follow-up visit or may suggest a consultation with a spe cialist. (O f course, this is not entirely up to the physician; the patient may request such follow-up procedures for more reassurance and, likewise, the patient may refuse to follow through.) In some cases, the patient may continue to initiate follow-up visits by seeking out physicians. In general, the consumer has less control with respect to hospital services-admission can be gained only with the authorization of a physician and once in the hospital, the physician essentially controls what services will and will not be provided.
A crucial point in this discussion is the idea that not only do physicians have a great deal o f discretion in treatment and referral decisions, but that wide variation in practice patterns may be con sistent with good quality care rendered in a careful and professional manner. Some physicians will have broad indications for surgery while others will impose stringent criteria for even suspected appendicitis. Some will make aggressive use o f laboratory tests to rule out conditions while others will rely more upon the patient's history and physical examination. In most instances, large scale trials have not been per formed to identify the course o f action leading to the best results. Wide variations in practice patterns often coexist in similar practice settings (e .g ., among independent fee-for-service practitioners in the same state), with no noticeable differences in outcomes (Roos and Roos, 1981; W ennberg and Gittelsohn, 1973; W ennberg et al., 1980) . This suggests that physicians in various H M O s and fee-forservice settings may consistently differ in their recommendations for treatment, yet still be within acceptable norms.
L ik e ly Im p act on Services in D iffe re n t S ettin g s
The likely impacts of the differences in price, accessibility, and practice styles on utilization o f services in different settings are summarized in Table 1 . W hile precise measurements of these effects are unavail able, in most instances each aspect can be identified as either increasing or decreasing utilization. One must note, however, that it is not always clear whether increased or decreased utilization is necessarily desirable. In general, increased access for patient-initiated visits is probably desirable, but one can even question that assumption. For instance, annual physical examinations for certain population groups are not cost-effective (Collen et al., 1973) . Moreover, frequent testing of healthy people increases the likelihood o f false-positive results and subsequent anxiety, invasive testing, and iatrogenesis.
The various factors listed in Table 1 influence utilization through different mechanisms. Some, like net price, travel time and costs, and w aiting tim e, enter into the consumer's implicit calculation con cerning whether the perceived problem is worth a visit. In general, because IPA-H M O s involve physicians primarily in fee-for-service office based practice, the only difference perceived by their HMO patients relative to their fee-for-service patients is more comprehensive coverage. The resulting lower net price will tend to increase utili zation. Prepaid group-practice (PGP) patients also face a lower (or zero) net money price, but other factors change simultaneously. They may not have a close relationship to a physician in the plan and thus may find it more difficult to take the initial steps to obtain treatment. PG Ps are typically centralized so that for most patients a longer trip will be involved. The PG P also generally involves a different set of time costs-appointments m ust be scheduled further in advance, but once made, waiting time in the office is typically less (Mechanic, 1976; Richardson et al., 1977; Luft, 1981) . Thus, while fees are not used by H M O s as a rationing device to influence demand, as is the case in the conventional system, there are other changes associated with the organization of group practice that make access both easier and more difficult. More importantly, as will be seen below, some of these influences on access may have different effects for people in different socioeconomic groups.
As one examines physician-initiated referral and follow-up visits and hospitalizations, differential physician behavior becomes more important relative to consumer factors. In part this is because con ventional insurance policies provide better coverage for hospital ser vices, tests, and procedures than for initial office visits, and because follow-up visits are more likely to be beyond the initial deductible. The greater physician influence also reflects the fact that when eval uating whether to make an initial visit, patients have only their own perceptions (as well as those o f friends and family) concerning the need for a visit. For follow-ups, referrals, and hospitalizations, the physician's presentation o f the severity o f the problem will play a key role. Thus, differential clinical decision rules are a potentially major factor in the H M O 's control over cost and utilization. This role is highlighted when one recognizes that in general, H M O enrollees are somewhat more likely than people in conventional plans to see a physician at least once a year, yet among utilizers, H M O enrollees have somewhat fewer office visits and substantially fewer hospitali zations (Luft, 1978) .
Thus far, the discussion may have suggested that the capitation or risk-sharing incentives o f the H M O lead H M O physicians to alter their practice patterns for their members. In fact, it is extremely unlikely that H M O physicians reflect upon the impact on their bonuses each time they consider a follow-up visit or an extra test. Instead, certain routine patterns are probably developed that tend to be con sistent with their economic incentives. Inconsistent patterns may be reexamined and slowly adjusted to reduce conflict with system incentives.
As before, the situation in IPA and PG P H M Os differs markedly. While the research has yet to be done, it seems unlikely that many physicians will use different decision rules for their fee-for-service and prepaid patients. The available evidence supports the notion that current levels o f risk sharing and patient loads in IPAs (10-20 percent withheld fees and under 15 percent o f the patients) have little impact on performance (Meier and Tillotson, 1978) . Instead, IPAs exercise controls through hospital-based utilization review and through edu cational efforts to change general practice patterns by showing that certain less costly techniques are equally effective. 'u cu G P rt cr
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tends to decrease utilization mixed effects PG P physicians typically see only H M O patients, so the altering o f practice styles may be easier because a " two-class" system is not necessary. Some H M O s develop extensive data bases on the use of tests by physicians and feed back this information. Merely seeing that he or she has an ordering pattern very different from the rest of the group is often sufficient incentive for a clinician to rethink decision rules. In other cases, active physician-education programs have been undertaken by the H M O (Thompson, 1979) . Another, perhaps crucial factor is self-selection by physicians. PGPs are often perceived by outside physicians as imposing restrictions on the practices of their clinicians and this is likely to deter even initial investigation by physicians who value highly the unconstrained ability to aggressively use any treatment. (Interestingly, PGP physicians often mention as one of the advantages of prepaid practice the ability to select treatments without having to worry about the financial cost to the patient [Cook, 1971] .) Similarly, physicians who value a wait-and-see approach may be attracted by the H M O setting which does not penalize them financially for not ordering batteries of tests. In this way prepaid and fee-for-service settings may attract physicians with previously devel oped practice styles consistent with their subsequent economic incentives.
A llo c a tio n o f C onsum ers A m ong System s
Thus far, the focus has been on the provision of services within an H M O or other medical care setting. However, it is important to also take a broader view and examine the question of who is allowed into the setting. H M O s, like other insurers, receive most o f their members through employee groups. Generally only a small number of people are allowed to enroll as individual (nongroup) If an H M O wishes to select a certain type of enrollee-healthy, white, female, upper income, or whatever-two strategies may be used. The first involves careful selection of the employee groups to whom the H M O option will be offered. For instance, firms with primarily white collar workers m ight be placed high on the marketing list while other firms m ight be ranked lower. (The mandating pro visions of the H M O Act allow a federally qualified H M O to require certain employers to offer the H M O as an option. There is no parallel requirement of an H M O to offer enrollment to any employer re questing coverage.) In general, it is difficult to document instances in which firms were not approached because their employees were thought to be too risky-numerous explanations for marketing pat terns can be described. However, there are some examples of behavior toward firms already in the H M O that support the notion of these techniques. In one case, an H M O in Minneapolis-St. Paul dropped its contract with a large local employer because maternity use within the group was too high (Matlock, 1980) . In another case, an HM O that phased in mental health benefits offered them first to working class groups least likely to use them while delaying coverage of uni versity groups anticipated to be higher users.
The second strategy for selection would be to attract certain types of people within the employee group. Various tactics can be used to influence enrollment. Premiums are often weighted so that family coverage is proportionately less expensive than individual coverage, thus attracting families with children who tend to cost less per capita than single persons or two person families. (This strategy is also used by conventional insurers.) H M O s have traditionally offered more com prehensive coverage of maternity care, again attracting young, rela tively healthy families. (Note that not all selection strategies are socially undesirable.) In other instances, the same factors that influence the use o f services by members also influence who becomes a member. The single most important determinant of whether someone will choose a prepaid group practice when given the option is whether that decision will break a strong existing tie to a physician; people with strong ties do not join, whereas those without such ties are much more likely to join prepaid groups (Berki and Ashcraft, 1980) . One explanation for the absence of a strong physician-patient rela tionship is low utilization of services. By chance or design, the PGP structure both attracts people without strong physician bonds and does not foster their development-and both features may lead to lower use o f services (Scitovsky et al., 1979) .
Another approach is in the careful location of facilities. While enrollment may be offered to any employee within a relatively wide region, if the clinics are only convenient to certain population subgroups, then enrollment is likely to reflect those locational factors. Similarly, access m ight be differentially altered for certain types of patients. For instance, appointment scheduling m ight be made easy and flexible for pediatrics and difficult for adult or geriatric medicine. The dual-choice option in the H M O is, in part, designed so that dissatisfied enrollees can leave the plan, removing both the source of complaint and the pressure on the organization to change (Hirschman, 1970; Phelan et al., 1970) .
Because the typical IPA-model H M O utilizes the practices of a large number of independent practitioners, it has less control than the PG P over certain features of its delivery system, but it has more control over others. In particular, IPAs occasionally drop physicians from their roster because of excessive utilization. The situation may not have to get to the point of formal severance. Repeated review and questioning of a physician's treatment patterns is probably suf ficient to cause withdrawal.
W hile some of the factors that have been discussed are rather subtle, they need only to result in relatively small differences among certain people to have a major cost impact from the perspective of the HMO. In general, a small fraction of the plan's enrollees account for the majority of its costs. Most people are fairly healthy and use ambulatory care and occasional hospital services. Clearly, it is in the plan's interests if certain features, whether by design or accident, tend to keep out those people who are frequent users of costly services. Note that not only does the plan benefit, but the relatively low-cost people who do enroll receive comprehensive coverage and usually excellent service at lower average cost, at least in part because they do not have to share the costs of their fellows. Conventional insurers have the same incentives to select healthy enrollees.
This leads to a consideration of the environment in which HMOs exist. The notion of risk spreading through community rating whereby everyone in an area pays the same premium has been almost universally replaced by experience rating whereby firms with young, healthy employees pay lower premiums while those with older and more costly employees have higher premiums. In spite of this, HM Os were tra ditionally community rated long before the HM O Act required them to do so. Only recently, in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, P.L. 97-35, has the law been changed to allow HM Os to take into account differences in enrollment mix. How they will use the increased flexibility will depend in part on future changes in the competitive environment.
Socioeconomic Differences in the Effects of Alternative Allocation Systems
The major feature of the H M O system from the consumer's perspective is that prices in the form of coinsurance and deductibles are absent. This suggests immediately that income and ability to pay will not influence utilisation, so the distribution of care may be expected to be more equitable. (In this case, equitable is taken to mean that services are allocated according to need rather than effective dem and.) However, the previous section identified other variables that may influence utilization and these may have differential effects by income group, race, sex, residence, or other factors.
To economists, the most familiar device used by HM O s to constrain patient demand is time. W aiting time in an office is " dead," un productive time. Many economists value time at the individual's wage rate so that an hour for someone earning $10 per hour is worth four times that of someone earning $ 2 .5 0 per hour. Other economists would argue that wage rates alone are not appropriate measures of the value of time to an individual. At a m inim um , wage rates must be compared to total income. Furthermore, a highly paid professional typically has more sick leave, flexibility in hours, and discretion than a dishwasher paid the m inim um wage. For the dishwasher, a long appointment wait may mean peremptory firing, not just an incon venience. In any case, it is difficult to determine the relative time costs in H M O s. Travel time is generally increased in PG Ps, but waiting time in the office is reduced. Furthermore, patients with appointments probably experience less variability in waiting time in PGPs. W hile it is difficult to know whether the shorter office waits benefit more the higher or lower income groups, they may make less difference to the retired who are probably not pressed for time, and there are numerous anecdotes of the waiting room as a social hall.
The long appointm ent lag in PGPs has a different type of effect. It has little im pact on people who have postponable, schedulable problems with a low anxiety component. Middle-class professionals are likely to fall into this category. The poor, parents of small children, and those elderly persons with recurrent urgent or acute problems may not be served as well by such a system. However, m ost PGPs offer 24-hour emergency coverage and urgent drop-in visits at the clinic, so services are available, albeit with longer waits and usually an unfamiliar provider. The PG P does have a substantial advantage over the typical emergency room in that the patient's medical record is usually available. Physical access to PG P H M Os may have a differential effect on various subgroups. The centralized location means that the poor and others without automobiles may find access more difficult. However, the presence of consultants, laboratory, X-ray, and pharmacy at the same site may be a special convenience to such people. Like insti tutions, large PGPs are also more likely to enhance access for certain subgroups, such as non-English-speaking minorities and the disabled. For instance, Kaiser offers a special teletypewriter (TTY) telephone line for hearing-impaired persons, a convenience not offered by many independent physicians.
The large, bureaucratic structure of some PGPs may create barriers for the less educated. There is often a ''system " that one must learn how to " w ork," rather than the helpful receptionist in an independent practitioner's office. On the other hand, the conventional system often offers no assistance in getting from one provider to another. The H M O also eliminates the need for complicated claim forms which often increase substantially the cost to the poor and uneducated because they do not claim the benefits due them.
Prepaid group practices are by their nature closer to some people than others. This may lead to much higher travel costs for residents of some neighborhoods. In most instances, because HM Os concentrate on enrolling employed populations, this implies reduced accessibility for people in lower-class areas. However, some HM Os have targeted their services to Medicaid recipients and thus are inaccessible to the middle and upper class.
HM Os can selectively try to enroll certain population subgroups. Clearly, they have incentives to avoid those groups with higher-thanaverage costs and utilization unless their premiums are commensurately higher. (N ote that, in part, this incentive is caused by the H M O 's community rating while other insurers rate by experience. An experience-rating H M O m ight even find high-risk people espe cially desirable because of the larger potential savings it could offer relative to the conventional system.)
E n ro llm en t C hoices by H M O s a n d the P oor
The most important factors in H M O selection with respect to the aged and the poor are policies set by the federal and state governments. Current Medicare provisions do not make it attractive for HM Os to enroll the elderly, nor are Medicare beneficiaries given any incentives to enroll in H M O s (Luft et al., 1980) . The Medicaid program allows states to contract with H M O s to provide care for the poor. In some states this has resulted in rather large programs, but in many areas Medicaid enrollment is minim al even though HM Os are available.
The poor, almost by definition, enter HM Os under circumstances different than those of the middle class who have a dual-choice option through their employers or unions. In general, the conventional health-insurance alternative for employees provides fairly comprehen sive coverage with some copayments and deductibles. Moreover, the middle-class family can generally use their conventional health in surance at a wide range o f medical care providers. For those who join, the H M O is the better of several fairly good options.
Poor enrollees in H M O s have generally entered through either of two routes-a demonstration project or a Medicaid contract. In a demonstration project or experiment, a government or private agency offers to pay the prem ium s for those people who enroll in the HM O. In a few instances, the family is given a choice of plans, but in almost all of these instances special monitoring programs and evaluations are included. (Such efforts are likely to influence, as well as measure, performance.) These demonstration projects often include special fea tures such as outreach coordinators and transportation programs not normally provided by the H M O (Freeborn et al., 1980; Coltin et al., 1978; Richardson et a l., 1977) . In some cases the experiment provided comprehensive coverage as long as the family stayed enrolled, but disenrollment would imply a loss of benefits. It is also the case that most demonstration projects for which data are available were un dertaken by mature H M O s with large stable enrollments of employed populations. Many of the HM O s supported substantial research staffs and most undertook the demonstration at least in part out of perceived social responsibility. All of these factors render such situations some what atypical and may alter the actual or perceived performance of the plan relative to a simple competitive market model.
In several states H M O enrollment has been made available as an option to M edicaid beneficiaries. Although on the surface such ar rangements appear analogous to the multiple-choice options available to employees, there are also some important differences. One is that conventional M edicaid programs generally do not include copayments or a premium paid by the enrollee, nor is the H M O able to offer additional benefits to the enrollee should it realize savings. Thus, the M edicaid recipient is not attracted to the H M O by its better financial coverage, lower cost, or improved benefits, as is the case for middleand working-class enrollees. Instead, the reason many Medicaid ben eficiaries take an H M O option is that few fee-for-service physicians in their area are willing to accept Medicaid patients. Rather than being attracted by a better system, the H M O may offer the only viable system and thus be under less pressure to perform well. In addition to the enrollees' incentives, it is important to examine the motives o f the H M O in negotiating a Medicaid contract. In most instances, this process is long and difficult, and the capitation rates offered by the state are often unattractive relative to premiums paid by employee groups. Thus, some plans that choose to attract Medicaid beneficiaries may do so because o f their own precarious position in the market. This is certainly not always the case, however, and some well-known and highly successful H M O s have tried to enroll the poor out o f a sense o f community.
Service A llo c a tio n D ifferences f o r D iffe re n t Socioeconomic G ro u p s
One problem in searching for differential consequences by socioeco nomic group is choosing the appropriate comparison population. One can argue that the poor have more health problems than the nonpoor, so the poor in an H M O should be compared to the poor in the traditional system. Alternatively, one m ight reason that the fee-forservice system is not now meeting the needs of the poor. Thus the experience of the poor in an HM O should be compared to that of the m iddle class in the same organization. Studies o f both types are available.
Most o f the findings concerning utilization o f comparable groups of the poor in H M O s and fee-for-service settings are discussed in Luft, 1981 (see also Vignola and Strumpf, 1980 For hospitalization, the results are remarkably consistent-lower admission rates for H M O enrollees in all cases. The prevailing opinion is that this generally is not due to an inability of patients to gain admission. In fact, somewhat lower utilization is probably good be cause o f the presumed excessive hospitalization in conventional set tings. W hile exceedingly low utilization rates may not be good prac tice, more detailed studies are necessary in order for us to determine if this is the case.
The second type o f comparison involves the poor and nonpoor in the same organization. The question is: Does enrollment of the poor in the same plan with the m iddle class, and with the same financial coverage, eliminate the general underservice of the poor found in the conventional system? In general, ambulatory utilization rates of the poor in mature H M O s approximates that o f the middle class.
However, some differences appear in the types of utilization by different socioeconomic groups. The poor are more likely than the middle-class enrollees to walk in or use the hospital emergency room instead o f a regularly scheduled appointment. The former results in fragmented care, but may better fit the life circumstances of the poor. Further adding to the fragmentation was the fact that when appoint ments were m ade, the poor had a higher no-show rate (Hurtado et al., 1973; Richardson et al., 1977; Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, 1970; Shragg et al., 1973) . It is difficult to identify the cause o f these utilization patterns, but it appears that to some degree the style o f service provided by the H M O S does not match that desired by the poor enrollees. O f course, the life circumstances of the poor may lead them to favor drop-in visits, emergency room use, and cancelled appointments in all settings, not just in HM Os.
These studies examined the behavior of special subgroups of the poor who were introduced to an ongoing H M O as part o f a dem onstration project. Such an arrangement requires adjustm ents by both the H M O staff and the new enrollees. An alternative research design examines whether different utilization patterns occur by socioeconomic group within the regularly enrolled population. W hile this approach is lim ited to employed people with an H M O option (and thus omits the very poor), it provides better measures o f long-run equilibrium. Furthermore, if differences appear, they are likely to be larger if coverage is extended to the very poor. Much o f this work has been done by the Kaiser Portland Research Center. Freeborn, Pope, Davis, and Mullooly (1977) summarize their results concerning outpatient utilization with respect to socioeconomic status. Health status measures appear to be the dominant factors, and once they are held constant, education, income, and socioeconomic class have little effect on utilization. The one exception is preventive service, which is not related to health status but, for women, is positively related to education and income. These studies also exhibit differences in the patterns o f ambulatory use that are related to so cioeconomic status-the middle class is more likely to use the tele phone for reporting symptoms and is less likely to use walk-in clinics (Pope et al., 1971; W eiss and Greenlick, 1970; Nolan et al., 1967) . Hetherington, H opkins, and Roemer (1975) argue that in PGPs people with more education and higher incomes can more easily "work the system ." W hile it is true that higher-income enrollees in Kaiser and Ross-Loos have more visits per year than lower-income enrollees, their own data show that this is also the case in the conventional plans. More importantly, low income PG P enrollees were much less likely to go without a physician visit, suggesting that the lower outof-pocket cost in the PG Ps more than compensates for any bureaucratic deterrent.
Taken together, these studies in large mature PGPs suggest some important differences in utilization patterns among regularly enrolled H M O members. W hile overall use of ambulatory services does not differ very much, especially when factors such as age, sex, and health status are held constant, the types o f services vary. The middle class is much more likely to use the telephone to report symptoms. Walkin visits and appointments, both of which are held during normal working hours, also appear easier for the middle class. W hile the unemployed may have a low time cost, the working poor probably have less flexible schedules than the middle class. Thus the poor are more likely to use the emergency room, and they are more likely to miss appointments without cancelling them.
T he C a lif o r n ia P r e p a id H e a lth P la n P ro g ram U n der M e d ic a id
The previous discussion provides substantial evidence that many HM Os have adequately served the poor and that their systems to constrain costs have not had noticeably adverse impacts. Y et, the history o f H M O s and the poor contains one chapter with a different tone-reports o f fraud, abuse, poor quality, and inaccessible services by some prepaid health plans serving Medicaid beneficiaries in Cal ifornia. To gain a better understanding o f how HM O-type services can lead to undesirable outcomes, it is useful to examine the California experience.
In 1970 California began a policy o f encouraging the development of HM Os to serve its Medicaid population. These organizations, called prepaid health plans (PH Ps), were supposed to save the state money be reducing unnecessary utilization and administrative costs o f claims reimbursement. The then governor Ronald Reagan also attempted to control utilization o f fee-for-service providers by lim iting office visits and requiring prior authorization for hospital admissions. (See, e .g ., Goldberg, 1975; California Department o f Health, 1975; Chavkin and Treseder, 1977.) This strategy was also designed to make H M O enrollment more attractive to the Medicaid population, because no such external restrictions on utilization would be imposed on H M O enrollees. Im plicit constraints were imposed because the HM O cap itation rates were pegged to the average fee-for-service costs. Most observers agree that the initial program was poorly designed with problems arising from marketing abuses, excessive administrative costs and profits, and poor quality o f care (Goldberg, 1975; D 'Onofrio and Mullen, 1975; Moore and Breslow, 1972; California State Legislative Analyst, 1975 ; U .S. Senate Committee on Government Operations, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 1975 Investigations, , 1978 .
The principal charges concerning marketing stemmed from PHP use o f door-to-door salespeople to enroll Medicaid eligibles. These people often posed as physicians or Medicaid officials and rarely ex plained fully the options available to consumers. Promises often far H aro ld S . L u ft exceeded reality. Salespeople attem pted to enroll only healthy indi viduals and told people with ongoing problems to stay in the fee-forservice system. These marketing abuses were at least partially attrib utable to the intense competition for enrollees among plans, which, in turn, was fostered by the ground rules laid down by the state (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1974). A PH P would sign a contract allowing it to receive a fixed monthly capitation fee of no more than 90 percent of the average fee-for-service cost of similar enrollees. No funds were available for start up or fixed costs, so it was imperative that the PH P enroll members as quickly as possible. Furthermore, in an effort to encourage competition and promote choice for Medicaid eligibles, the state took a laissez-faire attitude and authorized many plans to operate in the same service areas. W hile creating a situation in which there was a rush to enroll people, the state refused to release the names of M edicaid eligibles, so the PHPs had to use door-to-door salespeople paid on commission. There was also little control over PH P attem pts to enroll only the healthy and to keep dissatisfied members from disenrolling. The situation was almost perfectly de signed to lead to an aggressive attem pt to enroll healthy members.
There was almost no concern for even minimal quality audits in the early years of the PH P program, and only after June 1973 were medical professionals assigned by the state to audit PH Ps (California State Legislative Analyst, 1975) . A detailed investigation in 1974 of five PH Ps in operation prior to December 1972 showed substantial variability in quality, with some significantly better than fee-forservice Medi-Cal (the California Medicaid program) and some signif icantly worse. Plans with a high proportion of non-Medi-Cal enrollees scored consistently better (Louis and McCord, 1974) .
These differences in quality which appear related to the proportion of non-Medi-Cal enrollees are consistent with the notion that plans tend to provide comparable services for all enrollees and that the competitive environment has a major influence on the overall level of service. Large, mature H M Os have had to compete with conven tional insurers and providers for the employed population. In contrast, some of the PH Ps were established to serve only Medi-Cal prepaid enrollees while others were large fee-for-service Medi-Cal practices prior to converting to prepayment. In many areas, the poor have few alternatives-in 1972 less than 20 percent of Medi-Cal eligibles in Orange County saw ' mainstream" providers (Auger and Goldberg, 1974) . This review suggests that in the past competition for employed populations has led to a high quality of care and service by HM Os. (These mature H M O s were also established by individuals committed primarily to the development o f innovations in medical care rather than profitability, an issue to be discussed below.) But, competition per se is not necessarily good; the intense competition among PHPs for Medi-Cal enrollees encouraged their marketing abuses. Thus, fu ture policy strategies should examine the nature and level o f com petition most likely to lead to socially desirable results.
Potential Effects Under Increased Competition
It is important to remember that the preceding discussion o f H M O incentives and performance relates to a specific market environment and historical context. M ost mature H M Os (i.e ., those developed before the 1970s, which account for the bulk of total enrollment and most of the research studies) were started in an environment actively hostile to prepayment. The founders o f these plans were often vi sionaries with strong beliefs concerning the superiority o f prepayment and group practice (MacColl, 1966; Rothenberg et al., 1949; W il liams, 1971) . They often enlisted community support in their strug gles with organized medicine and sought to provide a better service at reasonable cost. Few o f these HM O s were operated on a for-profit basis and those aspects that were technically for profit, e .g ., the physician groups, rarely seemed to act as if profit were a major goal. The market environment has also been relatively noncompetitive. Often only one H M O existed in an area. Although H M O s competed with conventional insurers for enrollees, tax subsidies for health in surance benefits and employer ignorance or unconcern made the market orderly and quiet. Current proposals to increase competition in the medical care market suggest that it may be inappropriate to extrapolate from the past.
C h an ges in the C om petitive Environm ent
Several changes are proposed or in process to substantially increase competition. Various bills have been introduced to alter the tax laws to increase employee sensitivity to the cost o f health insurance (Ig-lehart, 1981) . Current law allows all employer contributions to be tax deductible for the employer and tax free to the employee. Many employers contribute more for more expensive plans. The proposed changes would place a cap on the employer contribution, require equal contributions, or give tax-free rebates to people choosing less expensive plans. Some employers provide " cafeteria style" benefit packages whereby employees receive a lum p sum in fringe benefits to allocate among various health, life insurance, pension, vacation, and other options. The proposed changes in the tax law would increase the desirability of such cafeteria plans.
Employers have also become more aware o f the cost of health in surance contributions and that this fringe benefit is a largely uncon trollable cost. Some employers have begun to alter their health in surance packages to increase cost control. One very popular approach is self-insurance and administrative-services-only arrangements in which the employer bears the risk and the carrier merely handles claims processing. The employer can then develop a substantial data base on cost and utilization and can exercise substantial control over reimbursement levels and payment flexibility.
New delivery systems and insurance arrangements are also beginning to enter the market. The older generation of PGPs and IP As has been joined by new H M O s with a frankly entrepreneurial orientation. Some are local organizations, often controlled by a few physicians, while others are owned and operated by large statewide or national insurers. In some instances it has been alleged that these new plans have a very short (2-3 year) time horizon on profitability, rather than the long-run perspective focusing on service delivery attributed to the older plans. (For example, the innovative United Healthcare plan sponsored by Safeco has been closed [Moore et al., 1980] .) The cur rently high interest rates make imperative the rapid payback of start up capital. New firms have entered the administrative services market with an emphasis on fast, inexpensive processing and a get-tough attitude toward providers. Such firms will sometimes offer a fixed fee, perhaps well below the physician's usual charge, and if that is not accepted, threaten interminable negotiations. Other plans are estab lishing " preferred provider organizations" in which selected costconscious providers are identified. If the enrollee goes to one of these providers, charges are covered in full, while for other providers stan dard copayments are required.
Simultaneously, the provider market is becoming increasingly com petitive. Falling hospitalization rates are leading to increasing bed surpluses so hospitals are more willing to grant concessions (Kralewski and Countryman, 1982) . For-profit hospital chains are expanding and sometimes concentrate on handling only certain types o f cases. In some instances H M O s are owned by these for-profit chains. The supply of physicians is also increasing rapidly relative to the population and in some parts o f the nation it is becoming difficult for physicians to start an independent practice and meet income expectations and debts incurred during training. This is leading to an increased willingness and sometimes eagerness by new, young physicians to accept a position with one o f the new H M O s or other plans.
P ossible E f f e c t s o f In creased C om petition
As competition increases, consumers and employers become more costconscious, and providers become more squeezed, various tactics may be used to ration resources inside and out o f H M Os. Plans will probably attem pt to control costs much more tightly than is currently the case. This may lead to the firing or dropping from provider lists of those physicians who appear to overutilize services (Physicians Health Plan, 1980) . Both approaches have been used in selected plans. The question, o f course, is whether the cuts are aimed only at the true " abuser" such as the physician who gives a vitamin B -1 2 shot to every patient. In a cost-cutting environment a plan may fail to distinguish the abusing physicians from those who have a sicker patient load. In either case, the patients o f those physicians will lose a provider and the ones who will be most affected are the frequent users with chronic high-cost problems. Similar approaches are not difficult to imagine. For instance, plans generally cover all but "experimental" services. By not updating the coverage list frequently, patients desiring such new and usually expensive procedures will be encouraged to switch insurers (Rybin, 1981) . Alternatively, the indications for a service or its delivery method may be structured to shift certain users out o f the plan. Many H M O s provide fairly comprehensive coverage of outpatient mental health care-often 20 or more visits per year, usually in a group therapy setting. W hile this may be sufficient for most acute problem s, it may not be very attractive to patients who wish long-term insight-oriented individual therapy. Such people will switch to conventional insurers with outpatient mental health benefits. Plans could attract well-trained board-certified physicians yet make sure that, while the primary-care physicians are well liked by the enrollees, most o f the specialists are foreigners with lim ited command o f conversational English. Such a strategy would, if associated with low prem ium s, attract the young and healthy, and repel the old and sick.
Even more subtle tactics could be used by IPAs or insurers through manipulation o f reimbursements. The allowable fees for certain types o f expensive specialists could be held down, either as a matter of policy or by updating usual, customary, and reasonable fee screens less frequently for low-volume specialties (Showstack et al., 1979) . Such an approach would increasingly shift costs to the patient and m ight even lead to a change o f plan. A crucial factor in such approaches is that a small number o f enrollees account for a large fraction of the costs (Roos and Shapiro, 1 9 81; E ggers, 1981; McCall and W ai, 1981) . Sm all changes that may affect only high users can have a major cost impact with little apparent effect on enrollment. Moreover, changes in administrative procedures or providers affecting this small segment are difficult or impossible to monitor from the outside.
Competitive strategies are even more likely to occur in marketing. Some of the procompetitive bills would eliminate minimum basic benefit packages. If such m inim ums are dropped, HM Os and insurers could compete for low-cost enrollees by offering benefits attractive to the healthy, like eyeglasses, while lim iting coverage for services required by high-cost enrollees. Plans are likely to target their en rollment toward the healthier groups, and within groups toward healthier and less expensive individuals.
Employers may also structure their benefit packages to reduce their own costs. For instance, it is reported that one W ashington, D .C .-based firm has designed its health-benefits option so employees married to federal workers will choose coverage under their spouse's plan, thus reducing costs to the firm. (W hile such anecdotal evidence is difficult to generalize, it is indicative o f the types o f behavior already observed which are likely to become more common. The examples are drawn from interviews during which anonymity was assured.) In another situation, a firm with a self-insured plan and a community-rated HMO option had personnel staff counsel people with health problems to join the H M O -and thus lower the firm's costs. Some employers with administrative-services-only contracts have their carriers identify highutilizing employees for special counseling. It is only a small additional step to pressure such employees to quit. Preemployment physical exams can be used to screen out not only people unable to perform their jobs, but those who may have costly medical expenses.
These are just a few o f the possible ways by which increased com petition may lead to a situation in which the young and healthy receive good low-cost coverage and the old and sick face expensive inadequate coverage-just the opposite o f the risk-pooling im plicit in socially desirable insurance. Many more tactics are likely to be developed as competitive pressures increase. W hile the old and sick are more likely to be poor, other factors will also increase the burden of such a competitive strategy for poor and female workers. Unions are likely to resist the fragmentation envisioned in this scenario and employers o f upper-income workers are also less likely to adopt pennypinching strategies. For instance, one electronics firm was said to avoid aggressive intermediaries because it did not want to offend its engineers with a hard line on claims. Low-income and non-union workers have much smaller employer contributions and are likely to be especially sensitive to the self-selection inducements o f a compet itive strategy (Taylor and Lawson, 1981) .
If Medicare and M edicaid are brought into the competitive strategy similar outcomes are possible. The experience with the "M edigap" policies suggests that many o f the elderly are not informed consumers of health insurance; the poor are apt to be even more vulnerable. Depending upon the value o f the "voucher" offered by the government, the Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries could be very attractive mar kets. On average, their medical expenditures (and im plicit premiums) are high, but again, a small fraction accounts for a very large fraction of the expenditures (Roos and Shapiro, 1981) . Furthermore, in contrast to employed groups, high expenditures among Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries are probably more likely to be associated with chronic conditions than sudden trauma so the importance of preexisting phy sician ties is even stronger. It may also be easier to attract people with certain chronic, but low-cost conditions while discouraging oth ers. For instance, a plan may emphasize a program for the blind, who are relatively low-cost patients, while making access difficult to car diologists. The relative absence o f informed agents, such as union negotiators, may make such strategies particularly easy if there is no government monitoring o f the process.
Ethical and Policy Implications of Rationing of Medical Care in HM Os
The previous sections have pointed out that the systems o f controlling utilization or rationing in H M Os are rather different than they might appear at first glance. W hile fees are not used to influence consumer demand, the burden is placed only partially on time prices. The seemingly endless queues reported in England are not evident in most H M O s. Instead, there is a different tradeoff between waiting time and appointment delay in PGPs and, while physical accessibility is more difficult in some ways, it is easier in others. Rationing tends to occur in much more subtle ways. Controls over services provided take place through an environment that encourages the medical staff to be more conservative in its use o f medical resources. Hard and fast rules on when a patient should be admitted have not been uncovered. Instead, although clinicians make decisions on a case-by-case basis, the overall pattern o f decisions is more conservative. This may be the result o f changing the practice patterns o f physicians or o f attracting those physicians who already have conservative practice patterns. Per haps a more important type o f rationing occurs through the process by which consumers enroll in HM O s. A complex mixture o f decisions by government, insurers, H M O s, employers, unions, and the indi viduals themselves results in H M O options being unavailable to some, expensive to others, and attractive to a relatively small proportion of the nation.
The effects o f these rationing devices on various subgroups o f the population are similarly complex. By and large, the poor and other disadvantaged groups enrolled in HM Os probably have better access to services than would be the case for them in the conventional system. Similarly, the differences in utilization among socioeconomic groups in H M O s are far smaller than in conventional settings. This is not to say that all differences are erased or that utilization o f services is strictly in proportion to need. However, many o f the remaining differences seem attributable to difficulties faced by the poor in all settings, rather than to specific hurdles imposed by the HM O s. Some what broader differential effects can be seen in those who have the option o f joining H M O s. However, this rationing through the avail ability o f enrollment options is to a substantial degree a reflection of market forces and government policies.
E th ic a l Issu es in A pproach es U se d by H M O s to C o n stra in U t iliz a t io n
Two major ethical issues arise when considering the methods used by H M O s to allocate medical services: 1) whether the economic in centives present in an H M O create unethical behavior by their phy sicians, and 2) whether the allocation system appropriately reflects medical need. Unethical physician behavior may arise from the loss of the physician as an impartial and trusted agent for the patient. This important issue lies at the heart o f traditional opposition to the corporate practice o f medicine. Abstracting from the rhetoric of such discussions, one can say that the appropriate level of treatment within the current market environment is that level of treatment which the fully informed patient would choose after weighing its risks and benefits, as well as its financial costs (Pauly, 1979) . (To simplify matters, we will assume the patient's insurance coverage is equivalent under both systems. Various redistributive schemes would add com plexity to the discussion but not alter its major conclusion.) A phy sician acting as a perfect agent for this patient would reach a similar conclusion. A physician who is also a provider o f care to this patient may no longer be a perfect agent and may be swayed by the economic incentives inherent in the payment scheme. If paid fee-for-service, he or she will have an incentive to offer more services, while if paid on a salary or capitation basis, there is an incentive to offer fewer services. The question is whether it is better to err on the high or low side o f the correct amount. Too many services increase not only cost but risk.
Unfortunately, it is rarely the case that the patient's problem is diagnosed with such certainty and that a course o f treatment is so clear that the " correct" amount is known. Instead, there is generally some uncertainty about the true nature o f the disease and often there are several courses o f treatment with no clear objective evidence as to which is best for the particular patient (Wennberg et al., 1980) . The patient does not have the expertise to really evaluate the potential choices, and I suspect that few physicians are able to deal explicitly with the uncertainty. In fact, even consciously recognizing the relative " softness" o f the decision may be such a burden that many physicians develop a " standard approach" to dealing with particular problems. Some may choose a very aggressive testing and treatment approach while others may choose to " wait and see" with minim al intervention. Yet both approaches may yield similar outcomes, especially since our measures o f outcome are rather insensitive. The similarity in results will reinforce each practitioner in his or her chosen approach. Wide variations in practice styles have been observed among independent fee-for-service practitioners, as well as within apparently similar phy sicians in both fee-for-service and prepaid group practices (Wennberg and Gittelsohn, 1973; Schroeder et al., 1973; Roos and Roos, 1981) .
W hile there may be a wide distribution across physicians in how they m ight treat a particular problem, fee-for-service physicians are more likely to be concentrated at the high service end and prepaid physicians at the low service end. This may reflect the role o f incentives in altering their clinical decision m aking. Alternatively, it may reflect a process of selection. Physicians who order fewer tests and procedures and hospitalize less frequently-perhaps because that is the way they were trained-will find it difficult to earn as much in a fee-for-service environment as will more aggressive physicians. Similarly, physicians with an aggressive approach will find a prepaid environment less rewarding than fee-for-service (McClure, 1982 ). Yet each type may be practicing within the generally accepted range of clinical behavior.
There are very few studies of different practice patterns in fee-forservice and prepaid settings that examine what is or would be done for identical patients. Overall measures o f the use of services are confounded by patient copayments, differences in case mix, and other factors. One very recent study queried board-certified cardiologists on how they would treat a series of patients described in brief case histories (Hlatky et al., 1981) . As m ight be expected, the independent fee-for-service physicians on average were much more likely than the prepaid group-practice cardiologists to recommend invasive testing and cardiac bypass surgery. However, the recommendations of the H M O physicians were similar to those of university-based cardiolo gists. In general, recommendations were comparable across practice settings for patients with the most severe manifestations, and major discrepancies occurred for patients with only one or two blocked arteries, a situation in which there is no clear consensus on appropriate treatment in the research literature (McIntosh, 1981; Kouchoukos, 1981) . Furthermore, some fee-for-service cardiologists were more con servative than the PG P cardiologists, supporting the notion that while the average recommendation may differ significantly, the PGP phy sicians are within a range acceptable to fee-for-service providers. In general, current studies o f the quality of care in HM Os indicate standards at least as high as those in the fee-for-service community (Cunningham and W illiam son, 1980; Luft, 1981) .
The second ethical issue is whether the systems used by HM Os to ration their services result in an allocation that reflects medical need. HM Os seem to perform well in allocating care among their enrollees largely according to need, rather than ability to pay. In this respect, their performance is superior to the conventional system in which copayments often serve as greater deterrents for those with lower incomes.
From a broader perspective, however, one may ask whether access to health plan s should be independent of ability to pay. There are two problems raised by this question. The first relates to the inability of the poor to pay for health insurance premiums. This problem can, in theory, be solved by giving the poor and low-income workers a voucher scaled to their income and family size that can be used to purchase basic health insurance. If they wish a more expensive plan they will have to pay the extra cost out-of-pocket, just as would be the case for the m iddle class. Everyone would be placed on an equal footing and access to good basic coverage would be available to all. Such an approach is outlined in Alain Enthoven's " Consumer Choice Health Plan" (1980) and is incorporated in the " Project H ealth" system in M ultnomah County, Oregon (Lewis, 1979; Multnomah County, Oregon, Project Health Division, 1977) . The " Project Health" system provided not only a basic voucher, but provided subsidies so that low-income enrollees did not have to pay the full marginal cost o f more expensive plans.
The second problem in assuring equal access to health plans arises from the higher cost of covering sick people and the resulting in centives for plans to avoid or push out such enrollees. As indicated earlier, increasing competition is likely to increase the attem pts by plans-both H M O s and conventional insurers-to enroll only the healthy. This suggests that people with high needs for medical care will have to purchase coverage at substantial out-of-pocket cost or else they will be forced out of the system. The proposed scenario is analogous to the change in insurance during the 1950s and 1960s which led to the virtual replacement of community rating by expe rience rating. An area would start out with a uniform rate for all persons. Insurers would identify firms with younger-than-average em ployees and offer a lower rate. As low-cost firms dropped out of the pool, the premium for those remaining would increase and the process accelerate. The result was a wide variation in rates charged to different firms with some gaining and others losing. Increased competition in the 1980s is likely to result in conventional insurers and HM Os trying to attract low-cost individuals within firms, leaving the older or sicker persons to high-cost plans. Furthermore, as the California PHP ex ample and other early indications suggest, the competitive techniques that may be used are not always aboveboard.
Im p licatio n s f o r H e a lth P olicy
The crucial policy issue that derives from this discussion is how can a competitive system be designed to allow for diversity and encourage innovation and efficiency without getting caught by an analogue to Gresham 's law in which cheap plans attract the healthy and exclude the sick. Unfortunately, it is far easier to raise concerns and identify problems than it is to propose solutions, but a few suggestions will be offered to promote discussion.
The basic approach in these suggestions is to reduce the benefits to those plans that select healthy enrollees and increase the penalties they would pay for pursuing such strategies. The first step would be to require a rather broad basic-benefit package for all plans so that people with specific health problems would not be deterred by benefit exclusions. Plans would be encouraged to compete primarily on the basis of price rather than coverage options. This will also make it easier for consumers to evaluate alternatives (Luft, 1982) .
The major difficulty with any competitive approach is that the effective premiums for the sick must be above those for the healthy; otherwise plans will develop strategies to avoid enrolling people whose expected costs exceed the premium. If it is possible to identify with reasonable accuracy those people at risk for high expenses, they can be categorized and charged a higher premium. This would entail a system analogous to, but much more complicated than, the point system used by carriers to adjust insurance premiums for drivers with poor accident or traffic violation records. A social decision m ight be made that most health problems are not the individual's responsibility, so government vouchers or employer contributions would be adjusted to reflect the individual's risk category. W hile a rather complex system might result, the philosophical precedent is already implicit in the current willingness to pay high premiums for Medicare coverage of the elderly, persons with kidney failure, and the permanently disabled.
The actuarial feasibility of designing risk-adjusted premiums and vouchers is quite another problem. M aking the premium a smooth function o f several factors such as age, sex, family medical history, and the like m ight avoid many of the problems associated with the yes/no decisions on disability eligibility. Such a system would make the sick and healthy equally desirable to plans because each brings a premium commensurate with expected costs. Very careful screening by plans m ight still produce some selection, but most of the benefit to plans of such approaches would be lost. The vouchers could be set at some constant fraction of the risk-adjusted premiums if price sen sitivity were desired. Furthermore, the plan's actual premium m ight be above or below the voucher level depending on the plan's efficiency. Enthoven (1980) includes a more restricted version of this notion in his discussion of actuarial risk categories. My major difference with him is in emphasis. I think we agree that without such adjustments competition will result primarily in a rush for healthy enrollees. However, I am much more skeptical than Enthoven about the technical feasibility of devising a sufficiently sensitive categorizing scheme, but this is a research question which has not to my knowledge even been explored in a preliminary fashion. The government's willingness to maintain its contribution levels for the most costly categories is a crucial political question that m ust also be addressed. This becomes particularly important if high-cost patients tend to enroll in certain plans (e .g ., those utilizing tertiary-care hospitals) and the plan's high costs are attributed to inefficiency rather than to patients with more complicated problems.
The rewards a plan can reap by pushing out its high-cost enrollees can also be reduced. It may be possible to develop monitoring systems whereby people who change plans report on the problems they ex perienced and whether they felt pushed out. For instance, the Cali fornia Public Employees Retirement System, which provides multiplechoice options for state employees, sends a questionnaire to all enrollees switching plans. Because such a system must be sensitive enough to identify important but infrequent complaints, it may be necessary to pool the data from many employee groups to obtain a sufficient sample. Such a system m ight be analogous to that used to evaluate automobile failures nationwide.
The incentives to keep nonusers while disenrolling users m ight be blunted by allowing enrollees to build up credits over several years for below-average use. If they switch to another plan, say after in curring an illness, some o f those credits would be transferred and drawn down by the new plan. If the previous plan induced them to stay, it could use some o f the credits to offset the patient's higher expenses. Although such an approach may be criticized as contrary to general insurance principles, it is designed to counter strong market incentives that may destroy the basic foundation o f risk-spreading insurance.
It should be clear that these are only preliminary ideas presented to encourage discussion. They rest upon the belief that HM Os cur rently provide an important alternative to the conventional system, but that potential changes in the market environment may result in rather objectionable behavior by H M Os and other health plans. Whether it will be possible to design the appropriate policies to encourage desirable, and discourage undesirable, performance rests on improving our knowledge o f how the medical care system works and on creating the correct incentives.
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